There is a lot of talk about a mubarakaism without Mubarak.
Although the army is a huge complex, it can hardly exercise a political rule
Elliot Abrams from the CFR:
Egypt’s economic problems are intractable and the Army has no answer to the demands for jobs and bread. It will soon conclude that throwing those problems at civilian, elected officials is a smart move. Moreover, the Army need not “govern” Egypt to protect its interests. It needs only to blunt moves to investigate its own economic and financial activities and to reduce its budget. The image of an Army that saved the people from dictatorship and then returned to the barracks is the stuff of legend and will help protect the institution against vigorous investigations.
Masry al-Yaum quotes Amr al-Shobaky on the chances of the Turkish model:
Amr al-Shobaki, political analyst with Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, believes that the success of the Turkish model in Egypt remains contingent on the political shrewdness of civilian political elite.
“We can reproduce [the Turkish model] as long as the civilian political elite is capable of offering a success story,” says al-Shobaki. “The progress that took place in Turkey had to do with the ability of the political civilian elite to transcend conventional dichotomies of secular versus religious. The Justice and Development Party succeeded in breaking this polarization and in establishing a democratic coalition.”
By presenting the Justice and Development Party as a democratic--rather than Islamic--political force since its founding in 2001, its savvy leaders--former Islamists--succeeded in curtailing the military’s role in civilian politics.
“If the civilian political elite fails to administer the political process in Egypt, the military will assume a role similar to the one played by the Turkish army before 1997,” adds al-Shobaki. In 1997, Turkey’s army forced Islamist Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan to resign. Erbekan had antagonized the Turkey’s devoutly secular army by seeking to restore Islam to Turkish society and politics.
Before 1997, the Turkish Armed Forces toppled three elected governments in military coups in 1960, 1971, and 1980 in order to squelch political turmoil or crush Islamists.
“I do not want the military to play this role,” says Mostafa Kamel al-Sayyed, a political science professor at Cairo University.
“The military did not take the initiative of interfering; they were called upon by the president and they emerged reluctantly,” adds al-Sayyed. “They are determined to return to the barracks.”
“[But], the army will continue to be interested in issues related to national security,” he continues.
Foremost among the foreign policy dossiers that the military is expected to control is the Egyptian-Israeli peace accord. Egypt’s yearly US$1.2 billion in military aid from the United States is conditional on Egypt honoring the treaty. Earlier this month, the Supreme Council for Armed Forces reiterated Egypt’s commitment to foreign agreements.
Some argue that before 28 January, Egypt’s army was depoliticized. Mubarak’s predecessor, Anwar Sadar, sought to demilitarize Egyptian politics, especially after concluding peace with Israel in 1979. He reduced the number of senior and retired officers in his cabinets and senior government positions, sacked commanders who opposed his policies, and decreased the military budget
Although the army is a huge complex, it can hardly exercise a political rule
Elliot Abrams from the CFR:
Egypt’s economic problems are intractable and the Army has no answer to the demands for jobs and bread. It will soon conclude that throwing those problems at civilian, elected officials is a smart move. Moreover, the Army need not “govern” Egypt to protect its interests. It needs only to blunt moves to investigate its own economic and financial activities and to reduce its budget. The image of an Army that saved the people from dictatorship and then returned to the barracks is the stuff of legend and will help protect the institution against vigorous investigations.
Masry al-Yaum quotes Amr al-Shobaky on the chances of the Turkish model:
Amr al-Shobaki, political analyst with Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, believes that the success of the Turkish model in Egypt remains contingent on the political shrewdness of civilian political elite.
“We can reproduce [the Turkish model] as long as the civilian political elite is capable of offering a success story,” says al-Shobaki. “The progress that took place in Turkey had to do with the ability of the political civilian elite to transcend conventional dichotomies of secular versus religious. The Justice and Development Party succeeded in breaking this polarization and in establishing a democratic coalition.”
By presenting the Justice and Development Party as a democratic--rather than Islamic--political force since its founding in 2001, its savvy leaders--former Islamists--succeeded in curtailing the military’s role in civilian politics.
“If the civilian political elite fails to administer the political process in Egypt, the military will assume a role similar to the one played by the Turkish army before 1997,” adds al-Shobaki. In 1997, Turkey’s army forced Islamist Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan to resign. Erbekan had antagonized the Turkey’s devoutly secular army by seeking to restore Islam to Turkish society and politics.
“I do not want the military to play this role,” says Mostafa Kamel al-Sayyed, a political science professor at Cairo University.
“The military did not take the initiative of interfering; they were called upon by the president and they emerged reluctantly,” adds al-Sayyed. “They are determined to return to the barracks.”
“[But], the army will continue to be interested in issues related to national security,” he continues.
Foremost among the foreign policy dossiers that the military is expected to control is the Egyptian-Israeli peace accord. Egypt’s yearly US$1.2 billion in military aid from the United States is conditional on Egypt honoring the treaty. Earlier this month, the Supreme Council for Armed Forces reiterated Egypt’s commitment to foreign agreements.
Some argue that before 28 January, Egypt’s army was depoliticized. Mubarak’s predecessor, Anwar Sadar, sought to demilitarize Egyptian politics, especially after concluding peace with Israel in 1979. He reduced the number of senior and retired officers in his cabinets and senior government positions, sacked commanders who opposed his policies, and decreased the military budget
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