What did the Egyptian revolution achieve? (updated)

From the demonstrator's demands:

1. Resignation of President Mubarak (Feb 11) (and his Vice-President probably too).

Although in a sort of a military coup: the High Military Councel rules that
the government stays in function; parliament will be dissolved and emergency law lifted "sometime" and constitution amended thru referendum

2. Dissolution of the Parliament and Shura  (Feb 13)

3. Constitution change process

Feb 15: The Military sets up a first timetable and a gives aways part of a responsibility to civilians-lawyers.  A committee do change 6 paragraphs of the constitution within 10 days to be submitted to referendum - last info - in 3 months
 -Feb 27 changes ready, announced by the committee:

In all, the panel suggested 10 amendments to the constitution.
They included allowing for full judicial supervision of the electoral process, starting with preparing rosters, to declaring results — which practically denies the police ministry oversight. That would address regular criticism that past elections were rigged, ensuring Mubarak’s ruling party retained its grip on power.
In what would mark a major change in who can run for president, the panel suggested lifting restrictions on who can run, opening the door for independents and small opposition groups to field a candidate.
It said candidates are eligible to run if they can collect 30,000 signatures from different provinces in Egypt; or if they can get recommendations from 30 members of Parliament; or if their party has at least one seat in Parliament.

Electoral law still missing:
But potential sources of tension arose as it emerged that key demands of protesters — including timing of the elections and the right of religious-based groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood to run in them — have not yet been addressed.


4. Partial change of the government - a promise and far from the expectations of the protesters
The "new" cabinet is a combination of 10 new appointments, 10 ministers from Mubarak's last change and 8 from the old guard.


5. Release of some of the prisoners. Far from all - the government only promised it.

Egyptian Prime Minister Ahmed Shafiq said on Saturday the government would soon release 222 of the country's remaining 487 political prisoners, the official MENA news agency reported.
Only a handful of them were arrested during the 18-day revolt that toppled former president Hosni Mubarak on February 11, he said, Agence France-Presse reported
"Prime Minister Ahmed Shafiq announced that there are 487 remaining political prisoners and the government will soon release 222 of them," the agency reported.
A leading Egyptian rights activist said on Tuesday that hundreds of people went missing during the protests, alleging that some are being held by the military, which took over the country after Mubarak's resignation

6. First new political party allowed: al-Wasat al-Jadid, in demand of a political party status since 1999

Seeking to prove Al-Wasat Al-Jadid has a more moderate position, Mr. Madi said two Coptic Christians and three women were among the party's 24 top members.

7. First trials of Mubarak's men.


CAIRO: Egypt’s former Minister of Interior, Habib al-Adly, will go on trial before a criminal court March 5 on charges of money laundering and profiteering, said Cairo court officials on Sunday.



During the protests:

1. Massive demonstrations in all parts of Egypt braved the martial law, forced the government to retire the police and forced the army to stand off and even protect them

2. The demonstrators made clear their claim for change and have the government and the army recognize the legitimacy of their claims

3. Formed a multi-age, multi-class, multi-confession non-ideological protest movement, in which ideological slogans (anti-imperialist, anti-Israel, Islamist) almost inexistent. It gave many participants an unprecedented sense of community

4. Pushed the traditional regime backer USA and the EU to openly call for transition and dissociate itself publicly at least from the President himself

5. Inspired protests elsewhere.

6. The government did not realize any of its requests by the fortnight of the protests, but started to undertake a mild reform by itself to offer the masses instead. Changes, that would have been immense a month ago no appear minimal. They include: Pres. Mubarak announced that neither he nor his son he will not run for president again; change of government; measures against the hated minister of Interior and crony businessman Ahmad Ezz; change of cadres at the ruling NDP including Gama; raise of state employees pay. The new face of the regime is Omar Suleiman, its longtime strongman.

7. The government has officially met with representatives of the Muslim Brotherhood, tacitly recognizing its legitimacy.

8. Degree of Liberation of state medias.

Western democratic help?

Larbi Sadiki: New politics in "Arabia" - please without democracy exporters-

Both the US and the EU will continue to compete in the field of democracy promotion. I was in Tunisia recently learning all I could about the revolution’s dynamics there. I happened to be in a political party’s headquarters for a meeting with its president and encountered a group of energetic Americans already busy networking and looking for democratic students.

My point is that Western governments must reflect before they send their democratic envoys and mentors. The young lady dispatched from the US and who was taking residence in Tunis did not feel confident nor did she display fluency about Tunisia’s history, much less its politics.

Here silence and incoherent short interventions revealed all. The colleague she came to Tunis to replace would have been a much better choice. Is that all America can scramble for democratisation in Tunisia? Just like Bush invaded Iraq with a huge army of which only six spoke Arabic.

What about Arab democratic knowledge? Al Jazeera, Kuwaiti parliamentary experience, Moroccan transitional justice, the bar associations of Egypt and Tunisia, the Islamists of Jordan and Egypt, women’s inclusiveness in Tunisia are all essential lessons in local democracy which should not be relegated to the margins

 Even when one forgets about how many Western governments chose to waltz with Arab dictators and in some cases fund them to safeguard themselves, one cannot forget about Western think-tanks, from Spain to Washington DC, many of whom have for years pontificated about Arab democratisation without direct knowledge of the locale and of language.

Unsurprisingly, most have got it wrong. Bread riots, for instance, were crying for attention and were rarely studied systematically. Interest in democratisation is largely filtered through a security mind-set, not as an ideal in its own right. Lots of money went into posh hotels and conferencing. It was a waste of resources. Very few could see, much less appreciate forms of bottom-up resistance and new forms of new media, including blogs and al Jazeera. The handful of scholars who were spot on go mostly ignored.

The onus is now on Egyptians and Tunisians to safeguard their civic triumphs and people power revolutions by transcending the narrowness of territoriality and parochial nationalisms. The youths of both countries who shared the virtual space of the blogosphere can now meet more directly to sustain co-learning through joint civic initiatives and institutions.

Essays on the change in Egypt

Larbi Sadiki: On the new politics in "Arabia"
The pan-Arab community which the military revolutions of the 1950s and 1960s failed to realise by decree or force, Arab citizenries can today construct through a democratic common sense of purpose.

This would encapsulate the common dream through transfer of democratic knowledge. Common tribunes, councils, associations and sub-networks become resources where democratic knowledge is invested as well as tapped into for the purpose of distribution and renewal.

Moreover, as far as the wider Arab World is concerned, democratic knowledge transfer would widen as other democratised Arab communities join in to further mobilise, network, and diffuse democratic know-how to other Arabs who assimilate, apply according to their local specificities and in their turn impart their own learning.

Grassroots activists and movements in acts of cyber-sabotage aimed at organising and informing Arab citizenries were the key to unlocking the bolted doors of the seemingly boundless power of their states. Today the paralysing fear of the security apparatuses of the state has dissipated. A self-affirming faith in civic cooperation and unapologetic demonstrations of dissent has taken over.



The extraordinary developments in Tunisia and Egypt during the first six weeks of this year, and more recently in Bahrain, Libya, Yemen and elsewhere, have inaugurated a revolutionary moment in the Arab world not experienced since 1958. If sustained uprisings continue and spread, it has the potential to develop into an Arab 1848 says Muin Rabbani.

Charles Hirshkind, The Road to Tahrir - the anthropologue's report on how social media changed politics and politcal dioscourse in Egypt even before 20100


Samuli Schielke: Power, normality, revolution - another anthropologue's reflexion who wintessed the revolution at Tahrir in person on the nature of power

Armando Salvatore: The elusive subject of revolution
Waking up to what looked like a new dawn, and not only in Egypt, a woman on Tahrir Square, who had participated in the last phase of the revolution, said on the morning of Saturday, February 12, “I can’t imagine all this really happened: Who did it?”

Gideon Levi, the Haaretz columnist and editor: Israel must congratulate Egypt
The news from Egypt is good news, not only for that country and the Arab world, but for the entire world, including Israel. Now is the time to be happy for the Egyptian people, to hope that this amazing revolution will not go wrong. Let us lay aside all our fears - of anarchy, of the Muslim Brotherhood or a military regime - and let this great gamble have its say.

Islamists and anti-islamist figures

The concept of post-islamism

Olivier Roy: Entretien sur le post-islamisme

Extremists? They are clearly losing in the process

Jason Burke exolains: Al-Qaida's senior leadership is too distant – physically and ideologically – to play any role in the dictators' demise

The slogans of Cairo or Benghazi are an explicit rejection of al-Qaida's message. They make no references to faith or the "Crusader-Zionist alliance". If Gaddafi and Mubarak are described as traitors, it is the nation – an idea seen by al'Qaeda as an illegitimate Western creation – that they have betrayed, not the ummah, the global community of Muslims.
Though currently banished to the physical and ideological margins of the Islamic world, al-Qaida's influence is still present – if only indirectly. Firsty, the return to nationalism is in part a reaction to the failure of the group's "global jihad", an ideology as disrespectful of local identities and independence as any other. Second, the polarisation resulting from the acts of al-Qaida and the western reaction to them over the last decade has contributed significantly to the broadly conservative social and religious views now held by very many people across the Islamic world. This latter element, controversially labelled "re-Islamisation" by some scholars, is likely to be of critical importance when, after the heady rush of events of recent weeks, the region finally pauses for breath.

Even this new conservatism however is not necessarily good news for al-Qaida. It exists largely outside traditional political activity and is more likely to work to the advantage of such classic political Islamists as the various branches of the Muslim Brotherhood than anyone else.

Liberal Muslims?

The Story of Ed Husain, ex-islamist, author  of the Islamist and his veiw on who are the Liberals

Women in protests

.. as seen by journalists

Direct account Jadaliyya account and on women in protests and a reflexion on violence
Noha Radwan, from UC Davis, explains that the violence is not Arab or Egyptian, it is political in nature, tuned against men and women, and againts women especially

While the attack on CBS News correspondent Lara Logan was a tragic and upsetting event, it needs to be understood in its political context. Any attempt to propound this in such familiar orientalist terms would be offensive and unfair, not only to Egyptians protesting for democracy, but to Logan herself. She was not attacked as a woman--although the gendered nature of the assault is indisputable; she was attacked as a professional journalist and a supporter of the Egyptian protest. I, too, was attacked, probably by the same type of thugs who attacked Logan. I understand both attacks in light of Egypt’s political conditions and the role of the Egyptian women in an ongoing struggle against oppressive and undemocratic government. The heinous attacks mark much more than “attitudes towards women.” Perhaps they mark the desperation of a dying regime.

Over the past few years, reports of women, both veiled and unveiled, becoming subjects of physical as well as verbal sexual harassment have filled the Egyptian media and online blogs and websites. Most notorious was the mob attacks on women in downtown Cairo during the celebration of Eid al-Fitr (the post-Ramadan Muslim holiday) in 2006. Women in Cairo, and in the suburbs, on the metro and in busses were frequently the target of sexual slurs and abuses, and were touched, grabbed and molested in broad daylight. According to a report by the National Council for Human Rights in Egypt, 83 percent of Egypt’s working females have been victims of sexual harassment at one time or another. Yet on Tahrir Square in 2011, there was no fear of sexual harassment. Even at times when space was at a premium and everyone was crammed together, the men on Tahrir went out of their way to assure the women of their safety from any form of harassment and provocation. I thought about the aforementioned report’s investigations into the reasons why men sexually abuse women on the streets of Egypt. The desire to exercise and prove their “manliness” was among the top reasons cited. Perhaps the men in Tahrir had nothing to prove. They had faced police forces shooting live ammunition. They were surrounded by army tanks, stilled for the moment, but still unpredictable and threatening.

Every day I went to Tahrir, I wore blue jeans and a light shirt with a jacket or sweater. My friends wore jeans, slacks and skirts. None of us covered our hair. On the square we sat next to women who wore western clothes and covered their hair, others who wore head scarves that were large enough to drape over their chests and back down to their waists. Some had their faces covered in the full niqab. We shared space and conversation, food and drink. Some of my friends smoked, others did not. At prayer times, some of the women joined in the prayers and others did not. On Tahrir, a woman’s religion, whether Islam or Christianity, and her piety were irrelevant. What mattered was that we were there, protesting a regime that has impoverished, marginalized or terrorized millions of Egyptians—women and men.

On February 2, the regime once again showed its ugly face and resorted to its old repertoire of violence that included attacks against women. But it was too late.



Female journalists and sexual violence- a report from Columbia Journalism review with a discussion below :
Judith Matloff explains the weird situation - that while assaults are frequent, they are not talked about: women do want to get assignments so their working and personal conditions are all the worse as a result

Women have risen to the top of war and foreign reportage. They run bureaus in dodgy places and do jobs that are just as dangerous as those that men do. But there is one area where they differ from the boys - sexual harassment and rape. Female reporters are targets in lawless places where guns are common and punishment rare. Yet the compulsion to be part of the macho club is so fierce that women often don't tell their bosses. Groping hands and lewd come-ons are stoically accepted as part of the job, especially in places where western women are viewed as promiscuous. War zones in particular seem to invite unwanted advances, and sometimes the creeps can be the drivers, guards, and even the sources that one depends on to do the job. Often they are drunk. But female journalists tend to grit their teeth and keep on working, unless it gets worse.

...

Rodney Pinder, the director of the institute, was struck by how some senior newswomen he approached after the 2005 survey were reluctant to take a stand on rape. "The feedback I got was mainly that women didn't want to be seen as 'special' cases for fear that, a) it affected gender equality and b) it hindered them getting assignments," he says

Continued protests

Here is a portrait of one of the most active democracy fighters: Hossam al-Hamalawy


"The job is unfinished, we got rid of (Hosni) Mubarak but we didn't get rid of his dictatorship, we didn't get rid of the state security police," he told The Associated Press while sipping strong Arabic coffee in a traditional downtown cafe that weeks before had been the scene of street battles.

Egypt's long-suppressed labor movement found a voice in December 2006, when the 26,000 workers at Mahalla Spinning and Weaving, north of Cairo, went on strike. The government acquiesced to their demands, but soon flurries of copy cat strikes were erupting across the country at other public and private sector factories.

El-Hamalawy was first covering the disturbances as a journalist, then helping to mobilize them as an activist, working with veteran shop floor leaders at the factories to help organize the laborers and, most importantly, get their message out to the rest of the world.

El-Hamalawy maintains that it was the eruption of strikes in the final days of the Tahrir Square uprising that prompted the generals to finally push out Mubarak after the protest seemed to have degenerated into a waiting game.

El-Hamalawy's zeal has mellowed little over the years, and just like when he was talking about overthrowing the regime 10 years before it happened, his demands today seem a bit unrealistic — like investigating the now-ruling generals for their own links to corruption in the Mubarak era.

But then a decade ago, no one would have thought Egypt's quiescent workers and civil servants would be taking to the streets.

"There is a revolutionary mood in the country and you need to push for those strikes," he said. "If you hold them back now we are actually screwed — those who carry out half a revolution dig their own graves.

How to change the constitution

On the constitution:


Tamir Mustafa from Fraser University, Canada:
The suspended constitution contains a curious mix of liberal and illiberal articles. Of the 211 articles in the Egyptian constitution, perhaps only a dozen are fundamentally illiberal, and these are easily identified. Moreover, many of the political liberties that the democracy movement want to see enshrined in a new constitution are already present in the suspended constitution. The more intractable legal conundrum facing Egypt is that most of the legal tools that the Mubarak regime used to dominate the political system are not found in the constitution. They are instead contained in the web of illiberal legislation that governs virtually all aspects of political and social life.

On the process proposed by the military:

Acc. to al-Ahram, Some judges deny legitimacy of the consitution committe, while its member defends the military's will to move quickly.

Tharwat Badwy, a respected expert on constitutional matters, has stated in an interview with Ahram Online that the constitutional amendments proposed by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, a task now handed to the constitutional reform committee, lacks legitimacy. He stressed that the supreme council is not elected by the public and so does not replace the parliament to propose specific constitutional amendments. He added that he withdrew from the first committee, proposed by the former vice president, after it became clear that the current Egyptian constitution of 1973 isn't legally fit for amending.

On another front, Atef El-Banna, member of the committee, indicated in a phone call to Ahram Online that the conditions dictate the amendments proposed, since the preparation of a new constitution, technically and procedurally, could take more than a year. El-Banna added that "the armed forces really want to transfer power in a short period, no more than year, and during this period we want to conduct parliamentary and presidential elections. How would this be done while a new constitution is being written?



"A new constitution is a long-term goal. Let's first get the flaws out of the system to bring the process along. The say of the people is the most important factor in this process," Sobhi Saleh told Reuters in an interview.

Lawyer Sobhi Saleh, the only member of the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood group on a 10-man committee proposing amendments to the constitution, said there would be a progress report later on Sunday to give details about planned changes.

Saleh said drafting a completely new constitution would only be possible when there are stable political institutions and established political forces to guide the process.

An amendment to allow the first multi-candidate presidential race in 2005 effectively prevented a realistic challenge to Mubarak, the ruling party candidate. Judges were increasingly sidelined from monitoring elections, that were routinely rigged.

"The committee will propose amendments to article 76 allowing three ways to run for presidency. This would give the people control over the electoral process," Saleh said, referring to the article governing presidential races.

Saleh said the committee was a technical one whose purpose was not to rewrite the constitution but is to remove "constitutional flaws" to aid the transitional period.

Alongside article 76, there was an official call to change five other articles 77, 88, 93, 179 and 189. These articles cover issues such as judicial supervision of elections, presidential terms and use of military justice.

"The main articles already announced will be amended but there will be suggestions to amend another set of articles that are necessary and linked to the main ones, all in the spirit of ensuring the constitution is not contradictory after the amendment process," Saleh said

Reflexions before Mubáraks ouster: 

The two transition specialists Alfred Stepan and Juan J. Linz suggestions for the new constitutiona are based on Eastern European experiences:

Most activists and commentators are now asking who will or should become the next president. But why assume that a presidential political system, headed by a powerful unitary executive, will be instituted? Of the eight post-communist countries in the European Union, not one chose such a system. All of them established some form of parliamentary system, in which the government is directly accountable to the legislature and the president's powers are limited -- and often largely ceremonial.

That was a wise decision. A presidential election at a moment of great uncertainty, and in the absence of experienced democratic parties or broadly accepted leaders, is filled with danger.

Fortunately, some Egyptian democratic activists and theorists are already debating the parliamentary alternative. In that case, Egypt's first free and fair election could create a constituent assembly that would immediately provide a democratic base for the government, as well as a means to amend or re-write the constitution

.Regardless of who leads it, there are some things an interim government should not do. Judging by the transitions that we have studied, a successful democratic outcome stands the best chance if the interim government does not succumb to the temptation to extend its mandate or write a new constitution itself. The interim government's key political task should be to organize free and fair elections, making only those constitutional changes needed to conduct them. Writing a new constitution is best left to the incoming, popularly elected parliament.

First, unlike presidentialism, a parliamentary system can give rise to multiparty ruling coalitions. Second, unlike a president, who, however incompetent or unpopular, remains in power for a fixed term, the head of government in a parliamentary system can be removed at any time by a vote of no confidence, clearing the way for a new, majority-backed government - or, failing that, fresh elections.


Apparent statement from the  Dean of the Faculty of Law  at Cairo University suggesting  a plan:
Fourth - The Necessity of the instant dissolution of both Parliament and the Shura Council due to the impossibility of their meeting as a result of final sentences issued from the High Constitutional court which nullify the results of the elections in many constituencies
Fifth- A call for the creation of a founding committee devoted to the creation of a new constitution that is in accordance with the current phase, with the condition that all political ideologies are represented in this committee as well as civil society organizations and all Egyptian communities
Seventh – The expansion of the current structure of the government in order for it to be an interim government dedicated to the nations recovery
Eighth- The issuance of decrees from the republic which would create laws that launch the right to create political parties and allowing citizens the rights of election and nomination for public office
Ninth- The swift restructuring of the state authorities in accordance with the new constitution


Tenth – The immediate termination of the enforcement of the Emergency law


Signed on behalf of the attendees
Dr Ahmed Awad Belal
Dean of the Faculty of La


Tamir Noustafa writes in Foreign Policy :
"While parts of the existing constitution are no doubt regressive, on the whole it is a surprisingly liberal document. Many of the fundamental freedoms that the pro-democracy movement wish to see enshrined in a new constitution are already present in the existing document. These include protections on the freedom of speech (article 47), freedom of the press (article 48), freedom of assembly (article 54), and freedom of association (article 55) among others. The constitution is also clear on the independence of the judiciary (articles 65 and 165), the independence of judges (article 166), and division of powers between the executive and the legislative branches. The state is subject to the law (article 65) and citizens are provided with guarantees to access their rights in a court of law (article 68).These fundamental liberties, it should be remembered, gave opposition activists the legal tools to challenge the regime throughout the past three decade"
"Some of the most egregious problems with the constitution were introduced in the 2005 and 2007 constitutional amendments. Article 76, for example, restricts the nomination of candidates in presidential elections to parties that hold a minimum of 3 percent of the seats in the People's Assembly and Shura Council... article 76 of the constitution raises the bar further for subsequent elections, when nomination must be secured from 65 members of the People's Assembly...article 78 (which sets no limit on successive terms for the Presidency), article 88 (which governs the supervision of elections), article 93 (which prevents the courts from invalidating membership to the People's Assembly as a result of election irregularities), article 179 (which provides broad powers to a Socialist Public Prosecutor)
..It was also recently announced that the Constitutional Amendments Committee, which was formed by presidential decree on Tuesday, agreed to amend six articles of the constitution, including article 76."

"Laws regulating the press, political parties, police powers, elections, trade unions, non-governmental organizations, and just about every other area of political and social life are designed to strengthen the hand of the executive."
SO
 "the constitution is the least formidable obstacle to change"




Even if the constitution is amended and Mubarak steps down, this web of illiberal legislation would remain on the books. It would provide the current regime with all of the same tools to manipulate elections and exert control over other areas of political life in very familiar ways.

About Qaradawi

Sheikh Qaradawi returned to Egypt, to be greeted not at the airport, but at Tahrir:

Sheik Qaradawi, a popular television cleric whose program reaches an audience of tens of millions worldwide, addressed a rapt audience of more than a million Egyptians gathered in Tahrir Square to celebrate the uprising and honor those who died.
“Don’t fight history,” he urged his listeners in Egypt and across the Arab world, where his remarks were televised. “You can’t delay the day when it starts. The Arab world has changed.”

On Friday, he struck themes of democracy and pluralism, long hallmarks of his writing and preaching. He began his sermon by saying that he was discarding the customary opening “Oh Muslims,” in favor of “Oh Muslims and Copts,” referring to Egypt’s Coptic Christian minority. He praised Muslims and Christians for standing together in Egypt’s revolution and even lauded the Coptic Christian “martyrs” who once fought the Romans and Byzantines. “I invite you to bow down in prayer together,” he said.

He urged the military officers governing Egypt to deliver on their promises of turning over power to “a civil government” founded on principles of pluralism, democracy and freedom. And he called on the army to immediately release all political prisoners and rid the cabinet of its dominance by officials of the old Mubarak government.

Scholars who have studied his work say Sheik Qaradawi has long argued that Islamic law supports the idea of a pluralistic, multiparty, civil democracy.

But he has made exceptions for violence against Israel or the“He is enormously influential,” Mr. Shahin added. “His presence in the square today cemented the resolve of the demonstrators to insist on their demands from the government.”

Political statements:


MY:
Youssef al-Qaradawi, head of the International Union of Muslim Scholars, has issued a fatwa permitting the killing of Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi. He urged Libyan military forces not to obey the Libyan leader's orders to fire at Libyan protesters.

In a live interview on Al Jazeera satellite channel on Monday, al-Qaradwai said whoever can fire a bullet at Qadhafi should do so.



About Qaradawi


JPost: In 2006 he told the Brotherhood website IkhwanWeb that the Islamist group “asked me to be a chairman, but I preferred to be a spiritual guide for the entire nation.”

Today he is best known in the Arab world for his program Shari’a and Life, broadcast on Al-Jazeera to an estimated audience of 40 million. A 2008 Foreign Policy magazine poll put Qaradawi third on its worldwide list of public intellectuals.

In his 2001 article for the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, “Al- Qaradawi: Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde,” Reuven Paz noted the contradictory nature of the cleric’s statements.

He was one of the first Islamic scholars to have condemned the September 11 attacks – but has supported attacks on US forces in Iraq and suicide bombings against Israelis.

“There is no enmity between Muslims and Jews,” he told rabbis from the radical anti-Zionist sect Neturei Karta visiting Qatar in 2008. “Jews who believe the authentic Torah are very close to Muslims,” he said, adding that “Muslims are against the expansive, oppressive Zionist movement, not the Jews.”

On several other occasions, however, the cleric has made comments critics denounced as anti-Semitic incitement.

Criticims of Qaradawi's positions on Shia from Egypt:
Qaradawi, an Egyptian who lives in Qatar, told a Cairo newspaper that Shiites are dangerous heretics armed with "millions of dollars and trained cadres of Shiites doing missionary work in Sunni countries."

Such talk dismays moderate Sunnis such as Egyptian writer and analyst Fahmy Howeidi. He says he respects Qaradawi, but says Qaradawi's comments about Shiite proselytizing were mistaken and their timing was quite dangerous.

"We already have the Americans raising the pressure on the Shiites in Iran, the Shiite Hezbollah in Lebanon and elsewhere, and now this," Howeidi said. "We don't need more tension just now."

Since his initial interview, Qaradawi has refined his attack, focusing on Shiite Iran as the most urgent threat to Sunni society. The response from moderates has been relatively quiet.

Egyptian author Tareq al Bishri disagrees with Qaradawi, but points his sharpest criticism elsewhere.

"We worry more about the American occupation of Iraq than we worry about any Iranian influence in Iraq," he says. "Here in Egypt we worry about the American support of Israel, which has its own expansionist ideas. From a religious point of view, whatever disagreements we may have with the Shiites are simply theological debates within a recognized framework."

Several analysts agreed that the muted response from some moderates is the latest sign of how nearly eight years of the Bush administration's foreign policies have tilted the political playing field in the region. Were it not for fear of being seen as siding with the Americans, they say, the reaction to Qaradawi's remarks would be much stronger.

Some of his positions:

Qaradawi on FGM

However, the most moderate opinion and the most likely one to be correct is in favor of practicing circumcision in the moderate Islamic way indicated in some of the Prophet'shadiths– even though suchhadithsare not confirmed to be authentic. It is reported that the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) said to a midwife:"Reduce the size of the clitoris but do not exceed the limit, for that is better for her health and is preferred by husbands".Thehadithindicates that circumcision is better for a woman's health and it enhances her conjugal relation with her husband. It’s noteworthy that the Prophet's saying"do not exceed the limit"means do not totally remove the clitoris.

Actually, Muslim countries differ over the issue of female circumcision; some countries sanction it whereas others do not. Anyhow, it is not obligatory, whoever finds it serving the interest of his daughters should do it, and I personally support this under the current circumstances in the modern world. But whoever chooses not to do it is not considered to have committed a sin for it is mainly meant to dignify women as held by scholars.

Who are the players?

1. Coalition of the Youth of the Revolution
or the Jan. 25 coalition, which represents the major youth groups, including the youth wing of the Muslim Brotherhood and April 6
LAT:
The broader youth movement, including members of leftist organizations, democratic groups and the religiously conservative Muslim Brotherhood, rallied around the death last summer of Khaled Said, a blogger allegedly beaten by undercover police officers in Alexandria. The activists launched Facebook pages, calculated how to persuade a historically reluctant Egyptian population to take to the streets and named themselves under the umbrella that eventually became the Jan. 25 coalition.
Mohamed Abbas, a coalition member from the Muslim Brotherhood, said members of the umbrella group have their arguments but remain unified. The 13 members of the group meet once a day.

Acts:


- held a news conference saying protesters should leave Tahrir Square and return next Friday to honor those who died during the protests.

First demands after ouster: IE:
Feb 13 - Revolution Youth Union, gathered 14,000 members in four hours and called for similar reforms.
The first group of reformists want a transitional five-member presidential council made up of four civilians and one military person.
Their communique calls for the formation of a transitional government to prepare for an election to take place within nine months and of a body to draft a new democratic constitution.
It demands freedom for the media and syndicates -- which represent groups such as lawyers, doctors and engineers -- and for the formation of political parties. Military and emergency courts must be scrapped.

Reuters:
"People's Communique No. 1" demands the dissolution of the cabinet Mubarak appointed on Jan. 29, and the suspension of the parliament elected in a disputed poll late last year
Some protest organisers said they were forming a council to defend the revolution and negotiate with the military

MY reports on the first youth press conference:
Youth leaders on Monday unveiled their blueprint for the upcoming transitional period, calling on the Egyptian Armed Forces to sack the existing cabinet and guarantee the implementation of democratic reforms.
In a policy paper handed out at a press conference on Monday, the “Coalition of Young Revolutionaries” called on the military to form a new interim government of technocrats within one month. This cabinet should be headed by “a patriotic civil personality that the people respect and trust.”

“We ask the armed forces to sort this issue out as soon as possible and dismiss all cabinet figures that belong to the National Democratic Party (NDP),” youth representative Shady Harb told reporters.
Later this week, the coalition is expected to raise a plethora of other demands listed in their policy paper, including the lifting of Egypt’s longstanding state of emergency; the abolition of martial laws and exceptional courts; dismantling of the NDP and the appropriation of all its assets by the state; respecting the right to form associations, unions and media outlets; dissolving the notoriously oppressive State Security Apparatus; and releasing all political prisoners.
The policy paper also calls for the abrogation of the restrictive law regulating the formation of political parties within ten days, and the drafting of a new law for the exercise of political rights within one month.

Towards a political party (MY):
A group of young activists are already in the process of creating a party called the 25 January Party for Development and Renaissance, which they consider “the first practical and democratic party in Egypt’s modern history.”
 They describe themselves as young people with no previous political affiliations who took part in the protests.

Adham Hassan, one of the party’s founders, says it has already received 50,000 applications and is now choosing its 50 founding members.


2. Wael Ghonim

Youth movement met with the military for the first time on Feb 13.
The two faces are W Ghonim and Amr Salama
That meeting was the known first face-to-face meeting the military has held with opposition leaders since taking charge of the country on Friday, after the resignation of President Hosni Mubarak.
Mr. Ghonim gave a detailed account of the meeting on the youth movement's Facebook page. He said the military appeared interested in a genuine dialog and seemed sincere in its pledges to meet protestors' demands.
The army also pledged to secure the release of detainees arrested during the demonstrations, according to Mr. Ghonim. The generals discussed with youth leaders how to ensure free and fair elections, Mr. Ghonim wrote. There was no way to confirm Mr. Ghonim's account of his meeting with the military, and the military has yet to issue a statement of its own regarding the outcome of its meeting with youth protest leaders.
"In summary of our meeting, I trust in the Egyptian army," Mr. Ghomim wrote on Facebook.
Ahmend Maher is often quoted next to Ghonim.

(Filmmaker Amr Salama, an ally of Ghonim, has been meeting with generals while trying to finish a movie on AIDS that he wants to submit to the Cannes Film Festival.)

Acc. to LA Times there is a split among the youth : between the "revolutionary movement" and the faces of the internet campaign". The first talks with the military involved only the latter. (Feb 17)

The major rift in the youth movement is between the Coalition for the Jan. 25 Revolution Youth and a clique of urban professionals led by Google executive Wael Ghonim and dentist Mustafa Nagar. The two groups had shared strategies in a ransacked travel agency and under a tent during protests in Tahrir Square that began in late January. But talks with the government involving members of the latter group in the last days of Mubarak's rule angered some members of the coalition.
"The guys from the coalition didn't like it," said Nagar, who has a persistent cough after inhaling tear gas during demonstrations. "They accused us of selling out the blood of the martyrs. And now that same coalition is trying to meet and talk to anyone they can. We are split from them completely."

Ghonim and other activists, including those with the April 6 youth movement, met about a year ago through the new National Front for Change, founded by Nobel Peace Prize laureate Mohamed ElBaradei. They studied methods for nonviolent protests and political movements that upended autocratic governments in Ukraine and Serbia.

Unlike a number of coalition members, Ghonim did not have a long history in the dissident camp. One coalition member referred to the Google executive as "just the support" because he posted a Facebook page that helped provide a catalyst for the demonstrations.
"Ghonim and Nagar are working individually and they don't represent any parties or political direction," said Nasser Abdel Hamid, a Jan. 25 coalition member. "The coalition is the only youth group that represents six of the most prominent political parties that have been active in Egypt over the last four or five years. We are planning to expand."


3: NDP: 
WaPo:  "several of Mubarak's ministers and party officials resigned Friday and Saturday as they tried to distance themselves from his discredited government."

Especially Hossam Badrawy tries to profile himself as a potential new face of NDP.

Thousands of memebers leave the party MY:
Resigned members announced their intention to establish a new party better able to fulfill their demands and respond to the aspirations of the Egyptian people


The party’s executive committee has changed twice since 5 February. 

A group led by former Party Chairman Safwat al-Sherif, members such as Gamal Mubarak (Hosni Mubarak's son) and others resigned after accusations were directed at the NDP leadership regarding the calamitous 3 February clashes.

Then the newly appointed chairman, Hossam Badrawy--much less stigmatized--resigned from the party on television, moments before the recently appointed Vice President Omar Suleiman announced Mubarak’s resignation on 11 February.

Many of the allegations concern infringements since Gamal Mubarak entered the fray in 2002 to found the NDP's Policies Secretariat, which he chaired.

Gamal, along with steel tycoon Ezz, instigated policies and a party framework that were seen as monopolizing the political scene in Egypt.

Presently the remaining party leadership is conducting a series of workshops and focus groups to look into a way forward for the party. “We hope to return to the founding principles of the party,” says Abdellah.

Reports of large numbers of resignations from the NDP’s three-million-strong membership have circulated, with no confirmed figures.

...there is a large number of “honorable figures” in the NDP who have not lost their credibility with the people--however he believes it is no longer tenable for them to continue working from within that party: “These people, such as Hossan Badrawy, should leave the NDP and form their own parties."

Badrawy has indeed begun work on a new political party, reportedly called the 25 January Party. 

4.  Muslim Brotherhood won't put up a candidate for president

Speakers:

- Esam al-Erian - most quoted

- Sobhi Saleh, the former secretary general of the Muslim Brother­hood’s parliamentary group
Sobhi Saleh is the MB's member on the six person committee to amend the constitution, nominated by the army, along with a Copt.

- Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh, a former member of the Brotherhood’s Guidance Council

- Muhammed Mursi, a Brotherhood leader who met with Suleiman

the head of the Brotherhood’s parliamentary bloc, Muhammad Sa‘d al-Katatni

the leader reputed to be friendliest to advocates of political participation, Khayrat al-Shatir, remains iprisoned
the newly-elected general guide, Muhammad Badi‘


In a statement on Monday, Egypt’s largest opposition group, the Muslim Brotherhood, said it would establish itself as a political party once the Constitution has been amended to allow it to do so.
The group asserted its confidence that Egypt’s Supreme Council of Armed Forces would meet all its promises pledged in its fifth statement to the nation on Sunday.
The group asked the armed forces to declare a timetable for amending the Constitution and holding new presidential elections. It also called for abolishing military tribunals and pardoning all political detainees.
It also called for free and fair parliamentary elections under judicial supervision, for abolishing the Emergency Law and forming a new cabinet of ministers approved by the public.



5. Ayman Nour and al-Ghad Party
Wael Nawara, secretary general of Nour's liberal Al Ghad party.


6. Amr Moussa resigned from Arab League and considers running for president.

|7. Muhammad al-Baradei and his committe

Acc. to the Guardian: Baradei opposes the rule by military: We need heavy participation by the civilians," said Mohamed ElBaradei, the former nuclear inspector who has become an opposition spokesman. "It cannot be the army running the show."

Army sidesteps B., apparently prefers to deal with W. Ghonim directly. 

8. Hizb al-Wasat
(Hizb) Al-Wasat, or “The Center (party)”, the group to which al-Beshry is associated, wasfounded in 1996 by Muslim Brotherhood members. There had been arguments between the Ikhwan and Al-Wasat, but in April 2009 the group joined the “Egyptian Coalition for Change,” an anti-Mubarak alliance which included individuals from the Muslim Brotherhood. This multi-party alliance had formed in 2005 and gained approval from the Ikhwan. Though Al-Wasat claims to be “universalist,” and has even invited members of Egypt’s Coptic Christian minority to join its ranks, it argues for Egypt to have strong links with Arab countries, both militarily and politically. Considering the history of pan-Arabism, Al-Wasat’s ideals – if implemented – are hardly likely to benefit Israel. Al-Wasat has a Facebook page.

- Unions

Can the army rule the country?

There is a lot of talk about a mubarakaism without Mubarak.


Although the army is a huge complex, it can hardly exercise a political rule


Elliot Abrams from the CFR:

Egypt’s economic problems are intractable and the Army has no answer to the demands for jobs and bread. It will soon conclude that throwing those problems at civilian, elected officials is a smart move. Moreover, the Army need not “govern” Egypt to protect its interests. It needs only to blunt moves to investigate its own economic and financial activities and to reduce its budget. The image of an Army that saved the people from dictatorship and then returned to the barracks is the stuff of legend and will help protect the institution against vigorous investigations.

Masry al-Yaum quotes Amr al-Shobaky on the chances of the Turkish model:
Amr al-Shobaki, political analyst with Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, believes that the success of the Turkish model in Egypt remains contingent on the political shrewdness of civilian political elite.

“We can reproduce [the Turkish model] as long as the civilian political elite is capable of offering a success story,” says al-Shobaki. “The progress that took place in Turkey had to do with the ability of the political civilian elite to transcend conventional dichotomies of secular versus religious. The Justice and Development Party succeeded in breaking this polarization and in establishing a democratic coalition.”

By presenting the Justice and Development Party as a democratic--rather than Islamic--political force since its founding in 2001, its savvy leaders--former Islamists--succeeded in curtailing the military’s role in civilian politics.

“If the civilian political elite fails to administer the political process in Egypt, the military will assume a role similar to the one played by the Turkish army before 1997,” adds al-Shobaki. In 1997, Turkey’s army forced Islamist Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan to resign. Erbekan had antagonized the Turkey’s devoutly secular army by seeking to restore Islam to Turkish society and politics.

Before 1997, the Turkish Armed Forces toppled three elected governments in military coups in 1960, 1971, and 1980 in order to squelch political turmoil or crush Islamists.

“I do not want the military to play this role,” says Mostafa Kamel al-Sayyed, a political science professor at Cairo University.

“The military did not take the initiative of interfering; they were called upon by the president and they emerged reluctantly,” adds al-Sayyed. “They are determined to return to the barracks.”

“[But], the army will continue to be interested in issues related to national security,” he continues.

Foremost among the foreign policy dossiers that the military is expected to control is the Egyptian-Israeli peace accord. Egypt’s yearly US$1.2 billion in military aid from the United States is conditional on Egypt honoring the treaty. Earlier this month, the Supreme Council for Armed Forces reiterated Egypt’s commitment to foreign agreements.

Some argue that before 28 January, Egypt’s army was depoliticized. Mubarak’s predecessor, Anwar Sadar, sought to demilitarize Egyptian politics, especially after concluding peace with Israel in 1979. He reduced the number of senior and retired officers in his cabinets and senior government positions, sacked commanders who opposed his policies, and decreased the military budget

Egyptian political intellectuals

Islamic:

- Mohamed Selim El-Awa; islamic law professor and acitivist

- Tarek El-Bishri: 
the judge

El-Bishri, 72, is a former vice president of the State Council, a historian and writer whose call for civil disobedience inspired the tactics of the reform movement. El-Bishri's reputation as an independent and fearless judge impeded his promotion to president of the state council while his nationalist views made him the Egyptian Movement for Change's (Kifaya) choice as presidential candidate, a proposal he turned down.

Interview in al-Ahram 

When to hold the elections: positions

AFP: ElBaradei warns against early Egypt election
All the gains of Egypt's revolution will be lost if elections are held too soon because supporters of ousted president Hosni Mubarak will get back in power, opposition leader Mohamed ElBaradei warned on Sunday.

"If we go too fast, if we organise elections in four or five months, it will be all over for the revolution, the old regime will perpetuate itself in another guise," the Nobel Peace Prize laureate told the Turkish daily Milliyet.
"Mubarak's party will make a comeback under a new banner. These people already have everything, money, the media.... Move too fast towards elections will mean allowing the old regime to get back into power with a new face," he said.

ElBaradei envisaged the creation of a presidential council composed of two civilians and one military member to manage a transition phase, which would include forming a constituent assembly, a referendum on a new constitution and the strengthening of political parties before elections.
He said polls should not be held until at least a year from now

Strikes and Unions

Feb 20: The demands of strikers at Misr Spinning and Weaving were met, the strike ended:

"We ended the strike, the factory is working. Our demands were met," including a 25-percent increase in wages and the dismissal of a manager involved in corruption, Naousha said.
Misr Spinning and Weaving is the largest plant in the Egyptian textile industry, which employs 48 percent of the nation's total workforce, according to the Centre for Trade Union and Workers' Services.

Banks, which closed last week as their workers staged protests demanding better pay and an end to corruption, reopened for business on Sunday.

The traps of transition

Larry Diamond in TNR: A truly democratic parliamentary election in Egypt cannot be pulled off in six months.

With no experience of democracy in recent decades, and no apparent government leadership that is committed to bringing it about, Egypt’s transition faces more formidable challenges than the transitions that led to democracy in recent decades in countries like Spain, Greece, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, the Philippines, Poland, South Africa, Indonesia, and Ukraine

The first trap is the Machiavellian opaqueness of the aging generals who are now running the country.
Their principal goal, it appears, is to preserve as much of the old order as possible—Mubarakism without Mubarak (the father or the son). This means another round of the old shell game of Arab regimes—what Daniel Brumberg has called “liberalized autocracy.”

To begin with, there appears so far to be little consultation with democratic forces in determining the character and pace of transition. Despite opposition demands, emergency rule remains in place, and so do many political prisoners. The military’s initial decisions have been unilateral and preemptory. We learn there will be a constitution drafted within two months, followed by a referendum. A respected retired judge will head the process. This will produce “amendments” to the now-suspended authoritarian constitution. But what will be the role for Egyptian opposition and civil society in this process?

The military is talking about early presidential and legislative elections, within six months. What could be more democratic than that? But, in fact, after the fall of a longstanding autocracy, it typically takes a lot longer than six months to organize competitive, free, and fair elections. Think of the steps. A neutral and independent electoral administration must be established.

Then, the next step must be to produce a new register of voters. Experts believe only a quarter of eligible Egyptians are registered to vote today.

It will be one thing to elect a new president and quite another to choose a new parliament in Egypt’s transitional flux. The military now suggests the two elections can be held together within six months. But they will have very different logics and requirements. A presidential election will be much simpler.

This kind of election can be done more roughly and quickly, tossing aside the voter register and just dipping every forefinger in indelible ink after it has marked a ballot for one presidential candidate or another.

By contrast, new parliamentary elections present formidable challenges. First, Egyptians (and hopefully not just the military) must decide what electoral system will be used. This choice can invoke arcane debate, but it may be one of the most important that Egypt makes in pursuit of democracy. If the electoral rules are “majoritarian,” in that they make it hard for small minorities to get elected, they will work to the disadvantage of not just small ideological tendencies but also the welter of new, emerging parties and political forces—many of them liberal and secular—that will just be taking shape and starting to test their strength. This will inflate the strength of the only two political forces that now have effective political organizations on the ground—the old ruling party and the Muslim Brotherhood (with a smattering of some of the other older opposition parties). If Egypt retains the current electoral system of two-member districts (with each voter getting two votes), these two established political forces could sweep most of the seats between them, marginalizing the moderates, polarizing the parliament and political system, and dooming democracy from the start. Creating a liberal center in democratic politics requires more than moral and technical support for these parties to function; it also requires rules that enable them to get traction.

A much better—and fairer—alternative would be to elect the new parliament using some form of proportional representation, so that parties would win seats roughly in proportion to their vote shares. That way, new parties could begin to gain a foothold in the political process. Perhaps ironically, the best way to do this might be the way Iraq now does, by using the existing governorates (29 in Egypt) as multimember districts, and having each district then elect a share of seats equivalent to its share of the population.

A truly democratic parliamentary election in Egypt cannot be pulled off in six months. In fact, it might require well over a year to prepare. But the alternative would be to rush to a vote with a flawed system that would leave Egypt’s new democratic forces on the margins not just of legislating but of constitution-making as well.

How a new permanent constitution will be drafted—if it is even intended by the military—also remains a mystery at this point. The worst option would be to have a closed and hurried process dominated from above by the military.

A thorough, inclusive, and deliberate process of constitutional drafting and debate can also help to breed a more democratic culture at both the elite and mass levels. A rushed and closed process perpetuates authoritarian mentalities (and, often, authoritarian rules as well).

Only a negotiated pact between Egypt’s surviving authoritarian regime and its emergent democratic forces can steer the transition through the current treacherous straits to calmer and freer waters. For that to happen, Egypt’s disparate democratic forces must unify in a broad negotiating front that unites the “outside” opposition of the youthful movements with the “inside” opposition of the “wise persons” and established parties who have so far dominated, on an ad hoc basis, the discussions with the old order.

he role for the United States and other international actors is not to dictate terms for the transition or structures for the new political order. That is not our place, and Egyptians of every political stripe will resent it. But international actors should offer training to political parties and technical and financial assistance to the new civil society organizations and state institutions needed to make democracy work.

Religion in changing Egypt

Religion in Egypt is already changing: political actors with religious background, the authorities, the relations between sects.
During the first, revolutionary phase the changes seem positive.

The head of Al-Azhar, once one of the world’s foremost institutions of religious scholarship, has called for its leadership to be elected,not appointed by the government, a change that could reverse decades of the institution’s abject subordination to the state


Cairo's OnIslam: Qaradawi, an Egyptian, will address the celebrators on the importance of the role of all Egyptians in building a free and democratic country, OnIslam.net learnt. He will also urge Egyptians to join hands in combating chaos that could be triggered by loyalists of the former regime. The sermon will also highlight the examples of national unity among Egyptian Muslims and Copts during the revolution.
No single attack was reported against churches or Copts during three weeks of protests against Mubarak’s regime. In a sign of national unity, Christians held a Mass on Sunday, February 6, in Tahrir Square as Muslim protesters formed a ring around them to protect them during the service.
Chanting “one hand,” they appeared holding the Holy Quran and the Cross as Christians and Muslims crossed their hands.


Al-Ahram updates on Qaradawi's sermon
12:56PM Al-Qaradawi calls on the "brave Egyptian army" to open the Rafah crossing so that Gazans can receive the supplies they need. Turning his attention to arab leaders, he says: "Don't fight history, you can't delay the day when it starts. The Arab world has changed."

12:40PM Al-Qaradawi praises the army's statements on democratic transition and asks them to liberate Egypt from Mubarak's cabinet.

12:33PM Al-Qaradawi extols Egyptians to persevere with their revolution as it "continues to build a new Egypt" and should be "protect[ed] from hypocrites." He condemns the regime for being the source of sectarianism in Egypt while in "here in Tahrir", Christians and Muslims strove side-by-side for their revolution.

12:19PM Yusuf Al-Qaradawi gives the Friday sermon from a podium in Tahrir Square to the hundreds of thousands in attendance. He praises the January 25 revolution, describing it as an "educated" one. Al-Qaradawi adds that it was not only Mubarak Egypt's youths defeated, they also defeated injustice and oppression.

12:12PM Prominent Islamic scholar Yusuf Al-Qaradawi is preparing to deliver the Friday prayer sermon in Tahrir Square. According to OnIslam.net, Al-Qaradawi was invited to give the sermon by youth activists grateful for his support of the revolution to oust the ruling regime

What is really the Egyptian army

The Slate asks some questions about the army and explains why they are hard to answer:

Almost everything related to the Egyptian military is a black box. The number of people serving, their salaries, the military's land holdings, its budget—none of that information is in the public record. Joshua Stacher, a political science professor at Kent State University who studies the Egyptian military, estimates that the military controls somewhere from 33 percent to 45 percent of the Egyptian economy, but there's no way to know for sure.

A Dec. 14 WikiLeaks cable dump exposed something that I had spent months chasing: The civilian regime has tried to neutralize the military's kingmaker powers by establishing it as a major stakeholder in the status quo. In a period of transition, the Egyptian military will be more concerned about whether Egypt's next president will protect its vast economic holdings rather than if he wears a uniform.

But reporting on the military is difficult. No one wants to talk about the subject, and people who are willing to talk don't want their names used. If civilians are worried, Egyptian journalists are petrified. "There is Law 313, [passed in] the year 1956, and it bans you from writing about the army," Hesham Kassem, an independent publisher, told me. "It's the taboo of journalism."

Retired military officers are also seen throughout the middle-management levels of private sector companies "It's a sort of jobs program," says Kent State's Stacher. "They tend to offer them higher salaries as a sort of golden parachute to get them out of the military and into the economy."

An ex-airline industry employee told me that at EgyptAir, the country's national carrier, "a lot of the middle management is becoming ex-m

Jonathan Wright argues to dispells some myths about the Egyptian army:

Here are a few myths about the Egyptian military that I have seen in print since the start of the popular uprising on January 25:

- the myth that the Egyptian military controls up to 40 percent, even 45 percent, of the economy
The ministry's revenues from the private sector are about 2 billion Egyptian pounds a year ($345 million). It employs 40,000 civilians
 By way of comparison Egypt's annual GDP is about 1,250 billion Egyptian pounds and the workforce is about 26 million.

 - the myth that all or most provincial governors come from the military. In fact, in line with the shift of emphasis under Mubarak from external to internal security, almost all provincial governors have been former police generals since the 1990s

 - the myth that the military had a hand in routine policy making throughout the Mubarak era.
When Mubarak faced an insurgency by the Islamic Group in middle Egypt in the 1990s, he relied solely on the Interior Ministry to deal with it and almost all the victims on the government side were policemen. The army stayed aloof.

- the myth that large numbers of retired army generals still hold key positions in state companies and bureaucratic institutions. This was true in the 1960s and 1970s, but the phenomemon has been very much in decline. No former generals have top positions at state banks, for example, where the leadership is entirely professional. The same applies to state media and publishing organisations.

It's hard to overstate how entrenched the military is, acc. to the Time
The army depends on the USA by a substantian part of its budget (up to a fifth? impossible to know how US support is spent, apart that it is for US goods) :
The secrecy begins with the military budget, which Jane's estimates to be about $5 billion. However, one independent researcher has calculated that actual military expenditures could be four or five times larger. Part of the budget is made up of U.S. military assistance of $1.3 billion annually that provides financing for Egypt's major weapons systems. (The funding must be spent on U.S. goods and services and is therefore effectively a subsidy for U.S. defense contractors.) As for the parliamentary committee responsible for overseeing those expenses, it is stuffed with police and military officers; the prospects for meaningful civilian oversight anytime soon are dim.

How strong and how democratic are the Islamists?

The acts?

Helena Cobban sums up why the MB appears as a valid partner in a possible liberal political system.

The Guardian sums up MBs situation: "Now, though – having been wrong-footed and overtaken by largely non-religious young activists – the brotherhood is seeking to regain its standing as the country's leading opposition movement, without turning either local or western opinion against it."


Telegraph India: Last Sunday, they joined Coptic priests, locking their Crescent with the Cross, at a salient solidarity show in Tahrir Square. Two days later, they pulled out with alacrity from talks with the Mubarak regime, sensing disapproval from the youth uprising and effecting correction. On Wednesday, they tore into both al Qaida’s call for a jihad in Egypt and Iranian leader Ayatollah Al Khamenei’s exhort for renewed Islamic revolution.
“We must ignore and denounce all such calls from al Qaida forums or Islamist forums,” Khaled Hamza, the editor of the Brotherhood mouthpiece, said. “What’s happening here is about the people of Egypt and their aspirations, we believe Egyptians are well capable of guiding their destiny.”
Despite protestations, they will keep off power politics for the time, the Brotherhood will probably be the cornerstone of how Egypt shapes post-Hosni Mubarak; although never tested in government, they are the country’s best networked cadre party.



During the protest, MB were part of the overlapping consensus, recounts a blogger in MY:

ursued by an exceptionally frenzied pro-Mubarak cluster, I scurried down the steps towards the anti-regime demonstrators. I ended up among a group of bearded men who welcomed me with ironic smiles. As an op-ed writer, I had been quite scathingly critical, often sarcastically so, of the Islamist movement, so I felt uneasy surrounded by a large group of its activists. But my fears were unfounded, as this group of Islamists had already internalized the norms of coexistence among the highly diverse crowd inhabiting Tahrir.

In the terminology of political philosopher John Rawls, this is the sort of interaction that, if nurtured, could form the nucleus of an "overlapping consensus" concerning the future of Egypt’s factious society--a consensus that excludes political positions and practices that are completely unacceptable to some segments of society.


Their words?


The prominent MB liberat, Abou el-Foutouh, says in the WaPo:
Our track record of responsibility and moderation is a hallmark of our political credentials, and we will build on it. For instance, it is our position that any future government we may be a part of will respect all treaty obligations made in accordance with the interests of the Egyptian people.

Because we are an Islamic movement and the vast majority of Egypt is Muslim, some will raise the issue of sharia law. While this is not on anyone's immediate agenda, it is instructive to note that the concept of governance based on sharia is not a theocracy for Sunnis since we have no centralized clergy in Islam. For us, Islam is a way of life adhered to by one-fifth of the world's population. Sharia is a means whereby justice is implemented, life is nurtured, the common welfare is provided for, and liberty and property are safeguarded. In any event, any transition to a sharia-based system will have to garner a consensus in Egyptian society



The spokesman Essam al-Errian in NYT:
We aim to achieve reform and rights for all: not just for the Muslim Brotherhood, not just for Muslims, but for all Egyptians. We do not intend to take a dominant role in the forthcoming political transition.

VOA: We're not Iran
A prominent member of Egypt’s officially-banned Muslim Brotherhood’s Guidance Council has “sharply” denied his organization wants an Iranian-style administration, after anti-government demonstrations forced long-time President Hosni Mubarak to step down following 18-days of protests.
Esam Alarian, spokesman for the Muslim Brotherhood, told VOA members of his organization are only interested in participating in parliamentary elections, not the presidential vote, as speculated by some international media organizations.
“Absolutely wrong; that is (a) false allegation. This is not true. We are calling for a civil state, moderate state, (and) a democratic state, equality, prosperity, justice for all and freedom for all citizens. All are equal. Egypt is not Iran. Egypt can build its own model of democracy according to its culture and Islamic preference
...
“Foreign policy is done by the president and it is supervised and monitored by parliament, and we are not targeting to have a majority in parliament. So, the Egyptian people can decide, not (the) Muslim Brotherhood. The new Egypt is not by (the) Muslim Brotherhood alone; it will be made by all Egyptians, Muslims, and Christians, liberals, socialists, nationalists and Islamists.”

USA Today (yes:) has an unclear statement from an unclear person from MB Abdel Fattah or Aboul Futouh?):

"The Brotherhood wants to put Egypt's peace treaty with Israel up to a referendum, Abdel Fattah said. And if the government decides to open border crossings between Egypt and the Gaza Strip, "we will support Hamas like others will," he said, referring to the U.S.-designated terror group that rules Gaza. Even liberals say they will pay more attention to the Palestinians than Mubarak did."
"Wael Nawara of Al Ghad believes the Brotherhood would gain 15% of the seats in an election today. Mohamed Zarea, a lawyer and human rights worker who deals with members of the Brotherhood, believes they would get 50%.!

The estimations?

The noted Egyptian writer, feminist and activist Nawal al-Sa'adawí - who has had difficult experiences with extremoists, about the Brotherhood:

I am not at all worried about the Brotherhood. There is a lot of exaggeration about this organization, and it is used to frighten women here and Western women, too. The Muslim Brotherhood is a minority. They do not lead the revolution, and many of the men involved in the organization want a secular constitution. Men and women protested in the square and died in the square together.

No, it was not the Muslim Brotherhood who hurt women, it was Mubarak's people who entered the square and killed. All of this talk about the Brotherhood is an attempt to use religion to divide the people. Do not worry; the Muslim Brotherhood will never rule Egyp

t.

The Egyptian sociologist Saad Eddin Ibrahime estimates in an interview in Resetdoc that

"if there were free and fair elections in Egypt, Mubarak’s party would get 40% of the votes, the Muslim Brotherhood a 20%. Then, another 20% would be won by al-Wafd party, a party established in 1919 but then outlawed under the Nasser era. It then re-emerged some 20 years ago. It receives a significant grassroots support in the countryside and from middle class. Mubarak’s party would control the biggest block but the balance would be given by smaller parties."

"Islamists in the best of circumstances could get between 20 and 30% of the votes in any elected government. No more than that. These results come from research and surveys we have been doing in our center, the Ibn Khaldun Center for Democratic Studies, over the last 30 years. However, in our part of the world, dictators use Islamists as a bogeyman in order to frighten not only the West but also the local middle class.

Wael Ghonim, the initiator of the January 25th protests, estimates in a CNN interview the participation of Muslim Brotherhood as rather low:

"Muslim Brotherhood was not involved at all in the organization of this. Muslim brotherhood announced that they were not going to participate initially. And if the young guys want to join they’re not going to tell them “no.”

I don’t agree with (the) Muslim brotherhood movement. I don’t agree with their ideologies. But whoever these are, they are Egyptians. These are good Egyptians. They participated…would say 10 to 15 percent of the people are there. They are just like Egyptians, they are honest and nice. They are not as bad and evil as they are trying to tell us."

The noted Islamic scholar Tariq Ramadan says in a Resetdoc interview that
"There is an internal struggle between generations and between trends, and I think that there is no monolithic reality of Islamism today."
and that especially the Tunisian Islamists a new, open-minded generation leads:
"Rachid Ghannouchi comes from the Muslim Brotherhood, but in the sixties and seventies he was the only one in this group to say that democracy is the right thing, while the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt was saying no. He did not have a problem with democracy. He had a far more liberal and advanced view, even in what he wrote about women, compared to other members of the Muslim Brotherhood, even from within this group! So there was a debate. In Tunisia you also have different trends arising from those who are much more Salafite, literalists."

Christian Science Monitor wrote in 2009 about

"a generational fault line between younger reformists, who seek a more active political role for the banned organization, and older conservatives whose influence is rising…."

"The Brotherhood, alongside other groups, participated in street protests calling for political reform and an end to the Mubarak regime. Mahmoud was encouraged to form alliances with outside activists and to give his opinion freely.

But subsequent government repression led the Brotherhood to “tak[e] a step backwards,” says Mahmoud, who explains that “whenever there is freedom, reformist ideas [within the group] will predominate; when there’s tyranny, conservative ones will.

"…government repression is the glue holding the Brotherhood together. If the Egyptian political system opened up, “the internal differences would become apparent in a way that might lead to the existence of more than one Brotherhood.”"

The noted (rather leftist) Arab political scientist Gilbert Achcar says in an interview:
"The Muslim Brotherhood's goal is to secure a democratic change that would grant them the possibility to take part in free elections, both parliamentary and presidential. The model they aspire to reproduce in Egypt is that of Turkey, where the democratisation process was controlled by the military with the army remaining a key pillar of the political system. This process nonetheless created a space which allowed the AKP, an Islamic conservative party, to win elections. They are not bent on overthrowing the state, hence their courting of the military and their care to avoid any gesture that could antagonize the army. They adhere to a strategy of gradual conquest of power: they are gradualists, not radicals."


Juan Cole, noted historian and publicist, in Truthdig:

The Brotherhood is a decentralized organization even in Egypt. It is not organized internationally. The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, e.g., is essentially a different organization from its Egyptian counterpart. Hamas has its distant origins in Brotherhood proselytizing in the 1930s, but it takes no orders from Cairo. Other political groups with a Muslim Brotherhood genealogy include the Iraqi Islamic Party, which cooperated with George W. Bush’s invasion of and administration of Iraq.

The Muslim Brotherhood is a fundamentalist organization. It is relatively hostile to women’s rights, and its vision of moving Egypt even further from civil, secular law to a conservative and literalist interpretation of medieval Muslim traditions is reactionary. Its literature is tainted with the worst sort of anti-Semitism. But decades of repression have not destroyed the movement, and there is no reason to believe that more repression would be more effective now.

There is another, proven, way to deal with this problem. The political success stories of the past decade in the Muslim world with regard to democratization are Turkey andIndonesia. In both countries the fundamentalist religious tendency has been liberalized and domesticated by its participation in the parliamentary process. Mubarak’s regime did not work. Democracy in Turkey and Indonesia has. Let us go with a winner for once.


The programme?


Mother Jones quotes:
Nathan Brown, a political science professor at George Washington University and an expert on political Islam, is optimistic that the Brotherhood has evolved from its fundamentalist roots: "Their agenda is to make Egypt better," he told Salon recently. "And their conception of what's good and bad has a religious basis. So that means increasing religious observance, religious knowledge. It also means probably drawing more heavily on the Islamic legal heritage for Egypt's laws. They don't want to necessarily completely convert Egypt into a traditional Islamic legal system. But if the Parliament's going to pass a law, they want it to be consistent with Islamic law."

al-MY quotes the spiritual authority for many MB's:
Preserving the people's freedom is more important than setting up a system of Sharia (Islamic law), even though freedom remains part and parcel of Sharia, said Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi on Friday evening in an interview with Al Jazeera television network. Al-Qaradawi, who is an influential Islamic thinker and president of the International Union for Muslim Scholars, is closely tied to the Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt's largest opposition group.

Relation with other islamists:

NYPost:
Islamic Jihad, which released an ominous statement threatening "attacks on sensitive targets" to avenge "the martyrs." The statement, issued by Tharwat Salah Shehata, an Islamic Jihad leader in exile in Tehran, reads: "We, in the Islamic Jihad, in solidarity with our Muslim brothers in Egypt, humbly pray to Allah Almighty to accept their dead as martyrs and heal their wounds. We wish we could be in the forefront of their ranks and share in their honor."
Hours after Islamic Jihad issued its statement, on Friday Iran's "Supreme Guide" Ali Khamenei appeared at a mass prayer rally to describe the Egyptian uprising, as well as Tunisia's "Jasmine Revolution," as "part of our global Islamic movement."
Khamenei insisted that this Islamist revolution targeted America and that regime change in Cairo would be "a bitter defeat for Washington."
This was the first time in years that Khamenei appeared publicly at the weekly prayers. His presence was part of an attempt by the Khomeinist leadership to claim that Islam, not democracy, was the Middle East's rising trend. Dozens of Islamic Jihad exiles in Iran were present at the ceremony, cheering Khamenei with cries of "There is No God but Allah!"
The Egyptian Brotherhood's supreme guide promptly rejected Khamenei's claim.
"This is not an Islamic uprising," Badi'e said in a statement. "This is a popular uprising that belongs to all Egyptians."


Past politics:


Helena Cobban interviewed Abul Futuh, the MS's liberal leader, back in 2007:
"We'd like to have cooperation with the regime, and with all the forces in society. The system here should be made more democratic. The regime should take true steps towards democracy. We understand they can't do it overnight, but they should do it with a clear timetable. They should take true steps against corruption. And work for the true inclusion of all the peaceful political trends here-- the Muslim Brotherhood, the Communists, everyone."

On Israel:

"The Jewish people can go or stay, but whatever they do the Palestinians should win their rights. You could have an outcome with one state there-- a secular, democratic state-- or two states. But I think one state would be better, because if you have two states, then they would fight. It would be better to be one state-- like South Africa."


WSJ about the programme draft:
Later in 2007, the Brotherhood attempted to clarify its vision by distributing a draft program for a political party it aims to establish. The document stated that a woman or a Christian cannot become Egypt's president, and called for the creation of a special council of Islamic clerics to vet legislation.
The draft appalled the government media, the secular opposition and even some relatively liberal members of the Egyptian Brotherhood itself.
Essam el Erian, the head of the Brotherhood's political bureau, says he has worked on a draft party program for years. The version that ended up being distributed by the group, he quipped, is so wrong that it probably "has been exposed to a virus."
Stung by the criticism, the Brotherhood's senior leadership eventually said the document it had released was not final. The group, whose 80-year-old supreme chief, Mahdi Akef, plans to retire in January 2010, froze the program's drafting.